Only recently, the versatile nature of temporary injunctions was affirmed by courts in Kenya upon issuing the same in favour of a Matatu owner. The injunctive order had the effect of keeping the litigant's substantial fleet of minibuses within Central Business District while the court was interrogating the validity of the City Council of Nairobi's directive that all matutus plying Jogoo Road (a busy highway leading from middle class residences into Nairobi) keep off the CBD. The order, which was ex-parte, has since been vacated when the same cam for inter partes hearing.
Definition of Temporary injunction
An injunction is classified as temporary as opposed to a permanent one. A temporary injunction is basically a provisional order of the court made pursuant to an application under Order XXXIX of the Civil Procedure Rules. Like all injunctions, temporary injunctions are orders requiring a named person to do, refrain from an act, stop an act or omission strictly stated therein.
Essentially, a temporary injunction lasts for a defined time or occasion defined by the order in contrast to the perpetual injunction. It is also called an interlocutory, interim or preliminary injunction as it affords a relief preliminary to the final one afforded by a judgment on merit.
Types of temporary injunctions
A temporary injunction may be either prohibitory or mandatory. A prohibitory temporary injunction requires the subject of it to refrain from specified acts for a given time ussually during the pendancy of the suit. A mandatory temporary injunction requires the doing of certain acts and/or carrying out of legal duties already being ommitted by the subject(s) of the orders. For instance, such order may require a school to re-admit an expelled pupil to school during pendancy of a case on the matter of the expulsion.
When the circumstances afford, a temporary injunction may be obtained ex-parte pending inter-partes hearing. However, ex-parte injunction usually lasts 14 days unless extended by the parties on consent e.g. by adjourning inter partes hearing of the injunction application beyond the 14 days.
At times, the court may refuse to grant an ex-parte injunction and choose to set the application inter-partes especially where the wrong has been already done. For instance, this happens in defamation matters where the defamatory material has already been published and there is only remote chance of a re-run of the story.
A quia timet temporary injunction may be granted to restrain/prohibit an anticipated wrongful act or omission. An example is where a party anticipates a demolition of a house by a local authority. Injunction may be obtained restraining/prohibiting such future/threatened demolition. The equity here seeks to save the propriator the agony of waiting the demolition without remedy.
Functions of temporary injunctions
On the function of temporary injunctions as equitable remedies, we look up to the case of Noormohamed Janmohamed versus Kassamali Virji Madhani [1953], 20 EACA 8. In the case, the court stated that Kenyan courts 'have always understood that the whole purpose of an injunction is that matters ought to be preserved in status quo until the question to be investigated in the suit can finally be disposed of'.
From the above statement, it seems clear that the object of temporary may be said to be "to preserve or restore the pre-dispute state until the trial or until a named day or further order." This is in keeping with the words of Chesoni, J in Gurbarsh Singh & Sons Ltd and others versus Bank of Credit & Commerce International (overseas) Ltd HCCC No. 2435 of 1982 that "the status quo referred to is the last uncontested status between the parties preceding the pending dispute'
Requirements for grant of temporary injunctions
Any discussion on temporary injunctions is not complete without a reiteration of the requirements for grant of injunction as set-out in the Giella Case. In Giella versus Cassman Brown, Spry, V.P stated as follows:
"First, an applicant must show a prima facie case with a probability of success. Secondly, an interlocutory injunction will not normally be granted unless the applicant might otherwise suffer irreparable injury, which would not be adequately compensated by an award of damages. Thirdly, if the court is in doubt, it will decide an application on the balance of convenience."
In interpreting the Rules, Richard Kuloba, J in his authoritative book: Principles Of Injunction has stated of them:
" [T]he right formulation of [the principles] would be this, that among other considerations a court takes into account in determining whether a temporary injunction should be issued, first, whether there is a significant likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits of the case at a full trial. Second, the court will ordinarily consider whether there is a threat of irreparable harm. Finally, there is the traditional consideration of whether harm to the respondent would outweigh the need for temporary relief. But there may be other matters, for example public interest, involved."[Emphasis his]
It suffices to say that the law on interlocutory reliefs is well settled. The same was favoured with a restatement in the recent case of Kitur and Another versus Standard Chartered Bank & 2 Others [2002] I KLR 630 where the court stated that:
"the applicant must demonstrate prima facie case that it has a case with a probability of success , that unless an order of injunction is granted by the court the applicant may suffer loss or injury which cannot be compensated by an award by an award of damages and in case of doubt the court should resolve the dispute on a balance of convenience."
The court of Appeal sitting in Mombassa in the recent case of Mrao Limited-v-First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 others [2003] KLR 125 applied the Giella case (supra) and settled the law on conditions for interlocutory injunction with its resultant holdings. Firstly, it held that the power of a court in an application for interlocutory injunction is discretionary. Secondly, it held that the principles for granting an interlocutory injunction are that:
the applicant must show a prima facie case with a probability of success;
an interlocutory injunction will not normally be granted unless the applicant might otherwise suffer irreparable injury which cannot be adequately compensated by award of damages;
if the court is in doubt, it will decide the case on the balance of convenience.
The 1st condition: Prima facie case with a probability of success
Generally, the first condition as to prima-facie is the most contested and offers the immediate challenge in most applications for temporary injunctions. Kuloba is of the view that on this condition of prima facie case with probability of success, the court first considers the legal situation.
In that regard, he reasons that the court here seeks to be satisfied that there exist reasonable grounds for doubting the legality of the apprehended or continuing acts of the defendant, and that they constitute a violation of the applicant's legal and equitable rights. The standard to be satisfied here has been expressed by the courts in diverse ways such as that the applicant must show that there exists 'a case to be tried' or 'triable issue' or a serious issue or question to be investigated' or 'a real issue' or substantial grounds for apprehending unlawful acts'. In the negative, the claim is not 'vexatious or frivolous' and/or 'insubstantial or illusory'.
In Anil Shah versus Akiba bank Ltd, Azangalala J stating the condition for the prove of prima facie case in grant of injunctions voiced the need for the court to caution itself thus:
"I bear in mind that this is an interlocutory application and I should not make definitive findings of fact or law in determining this first condition."
The issue in a claim for specific perfomance for breach of contract for sale of land with regard for prove of prima facie case becomes: Has the plaintiff presented an arguable case that the defendant's actions or omissions in the circumstances of this case in breach of the contract with regard to completion of sale?
In Nsubuga and Another versus Mutawe, Mustafa, J.A was of the view that:
"As regards … probability of success, the applicant must not only show that it will succeed but that he could succeed."
Thus in the case, the Plaintiff failing to, inter alia, satisfy that standard, the court of appeal of East Africa concluded that no interim injunction should have been granted in the case at trial level.
The Court of appeal in the Mrao Limited case (supra) interpreted the condition as to prima facie case. It held:
"A prima facie case in a civil application includes but is not confined to a "genuine and arguable case". It is a case which on the material presented to court, a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the other party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter."
The relevant general question with regard to the first condition is thus whether the Plaintiff shown that it can not only probably succeed but can succeed in the suit against the Defendants.
Conclusion
In conclusion, temporary injunctions are versatile and one of the most important innovations and remedies of civil litigation and equity.
There are basically three successive conditions for grant of injunctions. If the Plaintiff proves that he has a prima facie case with probability of success s/he then proceeds further to prove that the injury to be occasioned if the injunction is not granted cannot be repaired by damages. Equitable remedies like injunctions are generally not available where damages will be adequate compensation. If the court is still in doubt, you go on to proof that the balance of convinience favour Plintiff's grant of the orders of temporary injunction in comparison with the defendant(s).
