Proposed Amendments to introduce mediation in Kenya

The proposed amendments affect the Civil Procedure Act, introduce a new Order XLV B and create new forms. The amendments were presented to the Rules Committee for consideration. 

The rules are a blend of the Ontario Rules spiced with the Zambian Rules. These were considered to be the most apt for our jurisdiction.    The final draft was then presented to the Rules Committee on 30^th November 2004.

AMENDMENTS TO THE CIVIL PROCEDURE ACT

Mediation" means an informal and non-adversarial process whereby a neutral third person called a mediator acts to encourage and facilitate the resolution of a dispute between two or more parties with the aim of helping the disputing parties reach a mutually acceptable and voluntary agreement.

 

"Mediator" means an impartial person whose role in mediation is to assist an encourage parties to a dispute:

·        To communicate and negotiate in good faith with each other;

·        To identify and convey their interests to one another;

·        To assess risks;

·        To consider possible settlement options;

·        To resolve voluntarily their dispute.

 

"Impartial" means being and being seen as unbiased towards to a dispute, toward their interests and toward the options they present for settlement.

 

"Mediation Coordinator" is a person to be designated by the Chief Justice to be responsible for the administration of mediation under this Act.

 

Part IV – Special Proceedings

 

Mediation

 

S. 59 A (1)      Every suit may be referred to mediation unless otherwise excepted by statute, rule or court order or the suit involves constitutional issues, matters of public policy or has pending applications that seek to dispose the suit in a summary manner or where the trial court considers the case to be unsuitable for referral to mediation.

 

            (2)        A court ordered mediation shall be conducted according to the Rules.

 

 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES

 

ORDER XLV B

 

MEDIATION UNDER ORDER OF A COURT

 

Referral to mediation

1.   (1) In every suit instituted in court, a first scheduling and settlement conference shall within thirty days after close of pleadings for the purpose of referring the case to mediation be held and presided over by the mediation coordinator.

 

(2) A mediation under sub rule (1) shall be conducted by a person:

(a)   Chosen by the agreement of the parties from the list of approved mediators.

(b)   Assigned by the Mediation Coordinator from the list of mediators.

(c) Who is not named on the list if the parties consent.

 

List of mediators

2.   The court shall maintain a panel of approved mediators that meet specific qualifications and who adhere to court approved mediator ethics. The mediator shall be of not less than seven years in their respective fields.

 

 Mediators Fees

3.      (1) The mediators fees for the mandatory mediation session shall not exceed the amount shown in the following Table:

 

TABLE

 

Number of Parties	Maximum Fees (excluding taxes and expenses).
2	Kshs. 15,000.00
3	Kshs. 20,000.00
4	Kshs. 25,000.00
5 or more	Kshs. 30,000.00

 

(2) Each party is required to pay an equal share of the mediator's fees for the mandatory session at least seven days before the first mediation session.

(3) The mediator's fees for the mandatory mediation session cover up to three hours of actual mediation.

 

(4) After the first three hours of actual mediation, the mediation may be continued if the parties and the mediator agree to do so and agree on the mediator's fees or hourly rate for the additional time.

 

(5) If the mediator cancels a session under Rule 6 (2) of this Order because a party fails to comply with Rule 6 (1) that party shall pay any cancellation fees.

 

(6) If the mediator cancels a session under Rule 7 (2) of this Order because a party fails to attend within the first thirty minutes of the session, the party who fails to attend shall pay any cancellation fees.

 

(7) Two or more parties who fail to comply or attend, as the case may be shall pay the cancellation fees in equal shares.

 

(8). A party's failure to pay a share referred to in Rule 3 (2) or 3 (7) does not increase the share or shares of the other party or parties.

 

(9) A party who has instituted a suit in forma pauperis with respect to the proceeding is not required to pay fees under this Order.

 

Time limit

4.      A mediation settlement shall take place within three (3) months after being referred to mediation provided that time may be extended for a further sixty days by the mediation coordinator having regard to the number of parties or complexity of issues or with the consent of the parties which consent shall be duly filed in court.

 

Mediation hearing

5.      (1) The assigned mediator shall immediately fix a date for the mediation settlement and shall at least twenty days before that date, serve on every party a notice stating the place, time and date of the mediation of the settlement conference and advising parties that the settlement conference is mandatory.

 

(2) The assigned mediator shall file a copy of the notice in court.

 

Procedure before mediation

6.      (1) Every party shall at least seven days before the settlement conference comply with the following conditions:

(a). Prepare a statement in the prescribed form and provide a copy to every other party and to the mediator.

(b). The statement shall identify the factual and legal issues in dispute and briefly set out the position and interests of the party making the statement.

(c) The party making the statement shall attach to it documents that the party considers of central importance to the action.

 

(2) If it is not practical to conduct a mediation session because a party fails to comply with sub-rule one, the mediator shall cancel the session and immediately file with the mediation coordinator a certificate of non-compliance.

 

Attendance at Mediation Session

7.      (1) The parties, and their lawyers if the parties are represented, are required to attend the mediation session unless the court orders otherwise. If the party is a corporation, partnership, government agency or entity other than an individual, an officer or director of sufficient rank to settle the matter shall attend.

(2). If it is not practical to conduct a scheduled mediation session because a party fails to attend within the first thirty minutes of the time appointed for commencement of the session, the mediator shall cancel the session and immediately file with the mediation coordinator a certificate of non-compliance.

 

Statement of Understanding on Role of Mediator

8.      At the commencement of the mediation, the mediator shall read and explain to the parties the statement of understanding on the role of the mediator in the prescribed form and shall require the parties to the sign the form.

 
 

Non-compliance

9.      (1) When a certificate of non-compliance is filed, the mediator shall refer the matter to the court.

(2) The court may make any of the following orders;

(a)   an order that further mediation shall occur on any terms that the court considers appropriate.

(b)   an order that the pleadings of the non-complying party be struck out, unless the party satisfies the court that there was reasonable excuse for the non-attendance and that striking out the party's pleadings will be inequitable.

(c)    an order that the defaulting party pays costs.

 

 

Confidentiality

10.  All communication at a settlement conference and the mediator's notes and records shall be deemed to be without prejudice settlement discussions.

 

Mediator's Report

11.  Within ten days after the mediation is concluded, the mediator shall give the mediation coordinator and the parties a report on the mediation in the prescribed form.

 

Agreement 

   

12.  (1) If there is an agreement resolving some or all of the issues in dispute, it shall be signed by the parties and filed in court within ten days after the mediation is concluded.

(2) If the agreement settles the action, the mediator shall file in court a notice to that effect and the court shall enter judgment.

(3) If no agreement is reached the parties shall set the suit down for hearing.

 

Consent Order for Additional Mediation

13.  At any stage in the proceedings, the mediation coordinator may with the consent of the parties make an order requiring the parties to participate in an additional settlement conference for purposes of dealing with all matters required to be dealt with in any case at such a settlement conference.

 

No appeals against settlement

 

14.  No appeal shall lie against a registered mediated settlement.

 

Inadmissibility in Other Court Proceedings

 

15  (1) Anything said at a mediation session shall be inadmissible in any proceedings before any court of law.

      (2) Neither the mediator nor any person present at the mediation session may be summoned, compelled or otherwise required to testify or to produce records or notes relating to the mediation in any proceedings before any court of law.

      (3) A mediation session shall not be taped nor any transcript of it kept.

      (4) Any record of what took place at a mediation session shall not be admissible before any court of law, unless the parties agree in writing.

      (5) The provisions of this rule do not:

(a)   apply to a mediated agreement, or;

(b)   prevent the admission of factual evidence relating to the cause of action that would be admissible apart from sub rule (1) and/or (2) above.

 

 Immunity

 

16. A mediator shall have the protection and immunity in the same manner and to the same extent as granted judicial officers and judges under Section 6 of the Judicature Act (Chapter 8 of the Laws of Kenya).

_______________________________________

These are the proposed court-mandated mediation rules. But the amendments seems to have stalled mid-way. What is your take on them?

This extract was an annex to a paper by Allan Gachuhi: Court Mandated Mediation- the Final Solution to Expeditious Disposal of Cases (2006)

ELECTION PETITION DISMISSED FOR LACK OF SERVICE

Reported by ABRAHAM GACHIE
May, 2008

Nairobi-Kenya

Nasir Mohamed Dolal Vs Duale Aden Bare & 2 Others [2008] eKLR
(www.kenyalaw.org)

 High Court, at Nairobi (Visram J) 12th May 2008
 "dropping off court process at the gate of the MPs brother's house
could not constitute 'personal service' on the MP"

 The High Court has stuck off an election petition against Dujis MP
Mr Duale Aden Bare. The Petition was brought by one of his opponent
in the 2007 December Elections Mr Nasir Mohamed Dolal.

 Dismissing the petition High Court Judge Alnashir Visram said that
Mr Bare was not served with the petition papers as required by law.

 Mr Dolal had sought through a petition presented on 25th January
2008 to challenge the election results of Dujis constituency and had
prayed the court to declare the election of Mr Bare as the MP null
and void.

 However the MP sought to have the election petition struck off
arguing that he had not been served with election papers in
accordance with the law. He argued that the law required an election
petition to be presented and served within twenty-eight days after
the publication of the election results in the gazette. He said that
whereas the petition was infact drawn, filed and presented on time,
it was not properly served on him. He found out about the election
petition against him from a notice in the Daily Nation newspaper of
31st January, 2008.

 Mr Dolal on the other hand told the court that the MP was personally
served at his residence in Lavington. He vividly recounted how the MP
was served with the election petition papers. He said that he
accompanied his process server Mr Felix Munuve to the MPs house at
4.30pm on 25th January 2008, and on reaching the gate, he remained in
the car, while Mr Munuve proceeded to talk to the watchman. The
watchman then called the MP to the gate and on his arrival, Mr Dolal
came out of the car, identified the MP to the process server who
served him personally with the petition.

 Mr Bare the MP deponed that he had no residence in Nairobi and that
the 'house' referred to by Mr Dolal the petitioner appeared to fit
the description of his brother's house in Kileleshwa( not Lavington).
He also said that on 25th January, 2008 he was not in that house but
had spent most of the day in parliament with other members of
parliament.

 He narrated to the court a full account of his activities on the
25th January, 2008. He testified that he was at parliament in the
morning, walked to Jamia Mosgue for prayers at Lunch time in the
company of a colleague MP, and had lunch with her at 2pm. He spent
the rest of the afternoon at his Continental House office until
4.45pm, had tea at parliament with his colleagues and proceeded to
Savannah Restaurant in the city center with a colleague and then to
parklands at 6.15pm.

 Mr Dolal through his advocate Mr Mutua urged the court to disregard
the MPs testimony on account of serious contradictions as to time.
The court however dismissed his plea arguing that it was in the
nature of human conduct to differ on basic things, such as time.
People don't always remember everything in exactly the same way, the
judge said. He observed that Mr Dolal and his process server had also
contradicted each other on the time they went to the MPs "house", with
Mr Dolal saying it was 4.30pm while Mr Munuve the process server said
it was at 5.30pm. The judge observed that that alone did not make
them untruthful as unlike in a criminal trial, the precision of time
was not so crucial in civil disputes where the court was required to
decide issues of fact on a balance of probability.

 Justice Alnashir Visram considered at length what personal service
envisaged in the light of the Court of Appeal case In Kibaki vs Moi
where the court had stated:

 "Election petition are of such importance to the parties concerned
and to the general public that unless parliament has itself
specifically dispensed with the need for personal service, then the
courts must insist on such service".

 The Kibaki vs Moi decision handed by a bench consisting of five
eminent Judges of Appeal had elicited considerable public debate. The
arguments canvassed there were that there were circumstances where it
was not possible to effect "personal service", for instance on a
sitting president whose security detail would not allow personal
service.

 The Judges of Appeal in that case had ruled that:

 " . . . Section 20 (1) (a) of the Act (the National Assembly and
Presidential Elections Act cap 7) does not prescribe any mode of
service and in those circumstances, the courts must go for the best
form of service which is personal service. Before this Court, the
appellant did not offer any reason why he did not go for personal
service though in the High Court, it had been contended that the 1st
Respondent in his capacity as the President, is surrounded by a
massive ring of security which is not possible to penetrate. But as
the Judges of the High Court correctly pointed out no effort to serve
the 1st Respondent was made and repelled . . . .

 The decision clearly recognized that if personal service which is
the best form of service in all areas of litigation is not possible,
other forms may be resorted to."

 Justice Visram also cited the recent Court of Appeal case of Mwita
Wilson Maroa vs Gisuka W Machage & Others where the court held that
personal service was "actual physical service".

 The Judge therefore found that personal service was the best form of
service as was also held in the Abu Chiaba Mohamed vs Mohamed Bakari
(2005) eKLR where it was said that:

 "the truth of the matter is that personal service remains the best
form of service in all areas of litigation and to say that Members of
parliament are a different breed of people and different rules must
apply to them as opposed to those applicable to other Kenyans cannot
support the principle of equality before the law."

 The High Court judge said that the MP had presented a credible and
compelling case that he was indeed at Savannah Restaurant in the
company of an MP colleague at the time he is alleged to have been
served with the election petition papers at his brother's residence.

 He also found that Mr Dolal and Mr Munuve his process server went to
the MPs brother's house in the evening of 25th January, 2008 and found
a watchman at the gate. Upon asking him on the whereabouts of Mr Aden
Bare MP for Dujis Constituency, the watchman said he did not know of
such a person whereupon Mr Munuve the process server dropped the
papers under the gate.

 The court ruled that dropping off court process at the gate of the
MPs brother's house could not constitute "personal service" on the
MP. The court held that the petition was not served on the Member of
Parliament within the period of time prescribed by law and therefore
struck out the petition.

 Download File
<http://kenyalaw.org/Downloads_FreeCases/Election_Petition_No_28_of_2008_(2).pdf>

PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND DISPOSAL ACT 2005 OVERTUNED

By DAVID MUTUNGA

Republic v Public Procurement Administrative Review Board and
another Ex parte Selex Sistemi Integrati [2008] eKLR
(www.kenyalawreports.org )

 High Court, at Nairobi

 Nyamu J

 May 2, 2008

 The High Court has overturned the provisions of the Public
Procurement and Disposal Act, which provide that if a party is
dissatisfied with the decision of the Public Procurement
Administrative Review Board and prefers to challenge the same through
Judicial Review, that Review should be determined within thirty days.

 Selex Sistemi Integrati participated in a tender which had been
announced by Kenya Civil Aviation Authority and which the Authority
cancelled before the results of the tender had been announced.
Aggrieved by the decision of the Civil Aviation Authority to
terminate the tender without giving reasons for the decision to
terminate the tendering process, Selex Sistemi lodged an appeal for
administrative review with the Public Procurement Administrative
Review Board challenging the Civil Aviation Authority's decision. The
Board upheld the decision of the Aviation Authority by stating that
the Authority was right in terminating the tendering process.

 Jurisdiction

 Section 36 of the Public Procurement and Disposal Act 2005 provides
that a procuring entity may at any time terminate procurement
proceedings without entering into a contract and that such
termination shall not be reviewed by the Review Board or a Court.The
Act further states under section 100(4), that if judicial review is
not declared by the High Court within thirty days from the date of
filing, the decision of the Review Board shall take effect.

 Selex Sistemi on 20th December 2007 made an application for Judicial
Review challenging the decision of the Public Procurement
Administrative Review Board in which the Board upheld termination of
the procurement proceedings.

 When the application for judicial review came up for hearing the
Court's attention was drawn to a Notice of Preliminary Objection made
by the Civil Aviation Authority that the court had no jurisdiction to
hear a judicial review application, which had not been determined
within thirty days and further that the limitation clause was put in
the Public Procurement and Disposal Act to ensure speedy
determination of Public tendering process. Further the Civil Aviation
Authority contented that speedy determination of the public tendering
process was in the nature of public interest and therefore the court
was bound by the provisions of the Act limiting the time frame within
which the court could determine an application for judicial review
arising from the Public Procurement and Disposal Act.

 Selex Sistemi opposed the objection on grounds that section 36(1),
(6) and section 100(4) of the Public Procurement and Disposal Act
2005 was defective and unconstitutional as neither the Law Reform Act
and order 53 of the Civil Procedure Act which govern applications for
judicial review nor the Constitution puts a time limit on the High
Court within which to determine an application for judicial review.
Selex Sistemi contented that determination of judicial review
proceedings within thirty days in the instant case was impracticable
and as such section 100(4) does not apply to situations where it is
impracticable to complete judicial review proceedings within thirty
days.

 Issues

 The court was faced with the challenge of determining whether
section 100(4) Public Procurement and Disposal Act 2005 ousts the
jurisdiction of the court in judicial review, whether the said
section is therefore unconstitutional and whether the public interest
of finality in procurement procedures outweigh judicial adjudication.

 In a 58 page ruling Justice Nyamu stated that judicial review plays
an important role in our society which is to check excesses,
omnipotence, arbitrariness, abuse of power and also accountability
and maintenance of constitutionalism and the rule of law. In
reiterating the words of an American Chief Justice Marshall in the
celebrated case of Marbury v Madison, Justice Nyamu stated that
judicial review provides the best means of enforcing the peoples will
as declared in the Constitution without resort to drastic remedy of
Revolution. Without judicial review, the legislative branch would
enjoy a practical and real omnipotence and would reduce to nothing
what is deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions- a
written constitution. He stated that the High Court has jurisdiction
to review legislation in order to establish whether it complies with
the Constitution, and further that judicial review enables the High
Court to review acts, decisions and omissions of public authorities
in order to establish whether they have exceeded or abused their
power.

 Justice Nyamu said that the Constitution from where the Court
derives its judicial review powers is the supreme law of the land and
if any other law is inconsistent with the Constitution that law shall
to the extent of the inconsistency be void. He stated that section 36
(6) of the Public Procurement and Disposal Act 2005 purports to oust
jurisdiction of the Court that had been granted by the constitution
to determine all matters of judicial review. He further noted that
section 100 (4) of the Public Procurement and Disposal Act 2005
authorised challenge of the Review Board's decisions by way of
judicial review yet at the same time imposing a time bar within which
the Court can express its opinion.

 Justice Nyamu stated that Legislative provisions that suggest a
curtailment of the courts' power of review, give rise to a tension
between the principle of legislative mandate and the judicial
fundamental of access to courts.Judges must search for critical
balance and deploy various techniques in trying to find it. The Court
has to look into the ouster clause as well as the challenged decision
to ensure that justice is not defeated.He further stated that
statutory provisions tending to oust the jurisdiction of the Court
should be construed strictly and narrowly.

 Justice Nyamu stated that though the intention of the Public
Procurement and Disposal Act 2005, of efficiency and speed in
determination of Public procurement is fundamental, the court must
put all public interest considerations in the scales other than
finality and efficiency considerations. He stated that fairness,
transparency and accountability were core values of our modern
society and could not be sacrificed at the altar of finalising the
public procurement decisions. He stated that the court must look into
each and every case and its circumstances and balance the public
interest with that of a dissatisfied applicant.

 Justice Nyamu held that speed is the hallmark of judicial review as
leave to make application for judicial review is filed under
certificate of urgency, and therefore finality is the very nature of
judicial review.

 As to whether section 100 (4) of the Public Procurement and Disposal
Act 2005 was unconstitutional, Justice Nyamu stated that the
constitution envisages hearing of a case within a reasonable time
with due regard to practicality.A reasonable time is not defined but
it is an issue of construction by the judge who presides over a
case.A reasonable time would depend on the circumstances of the case
and other relevant factors that the court must consider. He stated
that due to the backlog, the judge/population ratio, the thirty days
stated under section 100 (4) is not reasonable in Kenya.

 The judge stated that section 100 (4) of the Public Procurement and
Disposal Act 2005 offends provisions of section 77 (9) of the
constitution which provides what a reasonable time should be for any
judicial task or function. He stated that the legislature by
providing that the Courts must hear and determine a judicial review
case within thirty days and the enthusiastic implementation of the
same by the executive was a deliberate encroachment to the strictly
operational independence of the judicially which is an independent
arm of the government and therefore section 100(4) was
unconstitutional.

 The judge ruled that ouster clauses which attempt to prevent the
judicial determination where the targeted body has no jurisdiction or
acted in excess of jurisdiction are incapable of ousting judicial
review jurisdiction of the Court. He stated that for an ouster clause
to be effective, it should be clear and unambiguous and that section
100 (4) of the Public Procurement and Disposal Act 2005 was vague,
ambiguous and indefinite therefore incapable of ousting the
jurisdiction of the Court.

 Supremacy of the Constitution

 Justice Nyamu held that the Court cannot blindly apply the so called
ouster clauses. He stated that unlike the English judges who must
always obey, or bow to what parliament legislates, because parliament
is the supreme organ in that legal system, in Kenya the Constitution
is supreme and the judges' first loyalty is to the Constitution and
in deserving cases the judge is at liberty to strike down laws that
violate the Constitution. He said that where jurisdictional issues
are involved ouster clauses, no matter how tightly worded would not
prevail and the court has the jurisdiction to declare any decisions
as nullities.

 The court in overruling the preliminary objection finally stated
that section 100 (4) of the Public Procurement and Disposal Act
purports to allocate judicial time in advance which constitute
usurpation of judicial function, and therefore unconstitutional. It
further stated that procurement matters are substantially contractual
and civil in nature and therefore the High court has unlimited
jurisdiction in both civil and criminal matters which cannot be
limited by the legislature or the executive by ouster clauses.

 Finally the court stated that it could have struck section 100 (4)
down for the reason that it is unconstitutional had a constitutional
application been made for that purpose.

 Download Case
<http://kenyalaw.org/Downloads_FreeCases/Procurement_Act_and_court_calendar.pdf>

When delay in lodging appeal was inexcusable

North Kisii Central Farmers Co. Ltd-v-Attorney General (Civil Application No. NAI. 186 of 1993 (unreported)

 

Court of Appeal: Tunoi, J,A (in Chambers); 30^th September, 1993

Advocate for Applicant: Mr. Oira

Advocate for the Respondent: Not disclosed

 

Authorities Cited

1. The public Trustee of Kenya-v-Francis Muchina Kamau (Civil Application No. Nai. 26 of 1985 (unreported)-Distinguished
2. John Kuria-v-Kalen Wahito (Civil Application no. Nai. 19 of 1983 (unreported)-Distinguished

 

Issue: Whether inordinate delay in lodging appeal could be excused on the ground that it was allegedly caused by negligence of an advocate?

 

The application was for leave to lodge notice and records of appeal out of time under rules 4, 9, 42 and 76 of the Court of Appeal Rules.

 

The judgment appealed against had been delivered two years before. It was argued in support of the application that the delay in instituting the appeal was attributable to the advocate previously acting for the applicant. The contention was that even though the judgment was passed in 19^th November, 1991, the advocate did not inform the applicant about it until March 1993.

 

Delay mistake of the applicant's advocate

It was submitted for the applicant that to deny the leave would be to visit the mistake of the advocate upon the litigant. The court was reminded in support of the holding in The public Trustee of Kenya-v-Francis Muchina Kamau (Civil Application No. Nai. 26 of 1985 (unreported). The Court of Appeal in that case held in that case that mistakes by advocates should not prejudice litigants in any litigation and should be excused.

 

The applicant also expressed the view that in land matters, parties should not be obstructed in having their disputes finally determined by the court. In support, the decision of the court of Appeal in John Kuria-v-Kalen Wahito (Civil Application no. Nai. 19 of 1983 (unreported) was cited.

 

Opposition on ground that delay inordinate

The application was opposed on the ground that there had been excessive, flagrant and inordinate delay on the part of the applicant.

 

The court agreed with Respondent and held that the delay was excessive, flagrant and inordinate. The learned judge was convinced that the delay was occasioned by the fact that the applicant did not bother whichever way the judgment went.

 

Court's reasons for agreeing delay inordinate

In coming to this conclusion, the court considered that the applicant evidently knew when the trial came to an end and also the date fixed for the delivery of judgment. Further, it reasoned that obviously the applicant was anxious to know the conclusion and the decision and therefore was incumbent upon it as a prudent litigant to be in constant touch with its advocate. In the circumstances, the court thought it unthinkable that the applicant would agree to be in the dark for about two years.

 

The authorities distinguished

The fact that the applicant did not file the application until after two months after the advocate informed him of the judgment was also considered. The court concluded that even if it was to be assumed that the former advocate was guilty of negligence, such delay by the applicant of being informed of the judgment was culpable.

 

On the fact that land issue was involved, the court considered that an innocent third party purchaser of the land not party to the subject suit was involved. It concluded that that explained why the applicant had been compensated for by damages.

 

Conclusion

In conclusion, the court found that the applicant had not given a reasonable explanation for the inordinate delay that had occurred and that the same had not been explained to the court's satisfaction. The court therefore declined to exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant and therefore dismissed the application with costs.

Lawyers historically monsters

I think we may class the lawyer in the natural history of monsters.

-John Keats-

L-K’ers: What is your take on this article? Email your opinion now to: pmusyimi@gmail.com

A bored judge and a funny lawyer

A judge, bored and frustrated by a lawyer's tedious arguments, had made numerous rulings to speed the trial along. The attorney had bristled at the judge's orders, and their tempers grew hot.

Finally, frustrated with another repetition of arguments he had heard many times before, the judge pointed to his ear and said, "Counsel, you should be aware that at this point, what you are saying is just going in one ear and out the other."

"Your honor," replied the lawyer, "That goes without saying. What is there to prevent it?" The insult escaped the judge!